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NOT ONE LAW AT ROME AND ANOTHER AT
ATHENS: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
IN NATIONWIDE APPLICATION
KENNETH L. KARST*
Eight years ago, in an opinion on the subject of sit-in demonstra-
tions, Justice Hugo Black sternly rejected an argument that had been
made to the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General. If the argument
were accepted, said Justice Black,
we would have one Fourteenth Amendment for the South and quite a
different and more lenient one for the other parts of the country ...
Our Constitution was not written to be read that way, and we will not
do it.'
For Justice Black, the point did not require elaboration. For him,
there was no need to derive a principle of constitutional universality
from such classical chestnuts as the one I have chosen for my title,
since he found the ideal of a national constitution to be written into the
Constitution itself. Cicero, on the other hand, was speaking of a law
that was not to be found in any constitution, or in any positive law;
for Cicero, it was the law of nature that was the same in Athens as it
was in Rome.2
The fourteenth amendment began as an act of positive law. Its
framers surely thought that their most important task was to extend to
the South a system of liberties and equality under the law that already
existed elsewhere in the Nation. Today, the fourteenth amendment
embodies much of what has become our natural-law Constitution. Af-
ter a century, the amendment stands as both a symbol of national unity
and a practical guarantee of nationally established rights.
Yet, the argument of the Solicitor General is not without appeal.
In oversimplified outline, the argument was this: In a state where ra-
cial segregation had not recently been an official state policy, the pro-
prietor of a lunch counter might decide to limit the clientele to whites
-and call on the police to enforce that policy-since the proprietor's
* Professor of Law, University of California School of Law, Los Angeles; A.B.,
1950, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.B., 1953, Harvard Law School.
1. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 334-35 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
2. CicERo, DE Loaus II, 4, 10, quoted in C. HAmNEs, THE REvIvAL OF NATURAL
Lkw CONCEPTS 9 (1930).
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individual acts of racial discrimination do not violate the fourteenth
amendment, which guarantees racial equality only against state action.
In the South, on the other hand, racial discrimination in restaurants
was part of a caste system. In describing that system, the Solicitor
General plunged into metaphor. The system was supported by a "com-
munity-wide fabric of segregation ...filled with the threads of law
and government policy woven by government through the warp of cus-
tom laid down by private prejudice."'  Thus when a lunch counter
proprietor in Maryland refused service to blacks, and asked the police
to arrest those who were supposedly trespassing by sitting at the coun-
ter and waiting for service, the state was implicated in the private racial
discrimination, and any trespass convictions violated the fourteenth
amendment. There is much to be said for the southern part of this
analysis. Where the asserted distinction fails is in its tolerance of sim-
ilar northern racial discrimination.
The underlying assumption in the Solicitor General's distinction was,
of course, that the South deserves different treatment because it is dif-
ferent. Jim Crow was and is a southern name for a system of caste
that reached its fullest development in the South.4 The South was the
obvious place to start in the constitutional assault on racial inequality.
As a result of this geographic priority, we have arrived at a position
that would astound the framers of the fourteenth amendment: In
some significant ways, the disestablishment of racial discrimination
has progressed further in the South than in the urban North and
West. While the fourteenth amendment was originally conceived as a
device for extending national rights into the South, our generation's
task is also to extend national rights from the South to the rest of the
Nation.
The issue will come into clearer focus if we look at two groups of
cases from the Supreme Court's past Term. Both sets of cases grew
out of claims of official racial discrimination; the first was a group of
southern school segregation cases, and the second consisted of two leg-
islative districting cases, one from Mississippi and one from Indiana.
The Court seized both its opportunities for doing racial justice in the
3. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
4. See C. WOoDwARD, ThE STRANGE CAREER OF Jim CRow '(2d rev. ed. 1966);
T-M ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION (. W'flliamson ed. 1968).
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South, but the Court's treatment of the Indiana voting case and the
manner of its reservation of decision on questions of de facto school
segregation are sobering reminders that the construction of nationwide
constitutional protections of racial equality is not yet completed.
I.
The principal school cases in 1971 came from the cities of Char-
lotte and Mobile. 5 Each city was part of a county-wide school dis-
trict. In the Charlotte case, the lower court had ordered the grouping
of inner-city black schools with outlying white schools; part of the plan
called for black children in the first four grades to be bused to the out-
lying schools and fifth and sixth grade white children from those schools
were to be bused to the inner-city schools. The Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed this order." In Mobile, the desegregation plan that
emerged from the court of appeals had left about 60 percent of the
black elementary students in all-black schools. The reason was that a
major highway divided the city, and a more thorough desegregation
would require busing. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, call-
ing on the lower courts to devise a desegregation plan that would
"work now," and specifically directing them to consider busing as a
means for ending a dual system of education.7
Neither in North Carolina nor in Alabama was school segregation
expressly commanded by law in 1971. The racial separation that re-
mained in Charlotte and Mobile was very much like the separation that
is found throughout the urban North and West. The syllogism for
this kind of separation is nasty, but it is simple: If the neighborhood
school policy is assumed to be inviolate, and if neighborhoods are
characterized by racial segregation, then the schools will be segregated.
In Charlotte and Mobile, however, the Supreme Court approved busing
as a way of destroying the syllogism by destroying its major premise;
the neighborhood school policy was not to be allowed to interfere with
the disestablishment of a segregated system.
These decisions mean at the very least that for a state to disestablish
a dual system it is not enough to repeal school segregation laws.
5. For elaboration of the analysis in the text see Karst & Horowitz, Emerging
Nationwide Standards for School Desegregation-Charlotte and Mobile, 1971, 3 BLACK
L.J. 206 (1971).
6. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
7. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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Something more is required, and that something is affirmative action
to achieve "actual desegregation" in "the greatest possible degree."
In the Charlotte case, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court,
said that "in a system with a history of segregation," there was a pre-
sumption against the continuation of schools that are composed of stu-
dents of all the same race, or nearly so; in such a case, he said, the
school authorities will have the burden of satisfying the Court that the
racial composition of the schools "is not the result of present or past
discriminatory action on their part."8 With this language, the Court
thus adopts the formula used by Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit
several years ago: the constitutional end, he said, is "the abolition of
segregation and its effects."
To understand why the Supreme Court's adoption of this formula is
important, we have to go back to the late 1950's, when the lower fed-
eral courts in the South were making their first efforts to -understand
and implement the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.'° One
view that came into vogue early in this process was expressed by a
prestigious three-judge district court. Speaking of the Supreme Court,
those judges said:
It has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in
the schools . . . . The Constitution, in other words, does not require
integration. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to en-
force segregation."
In the Charlotte and Mobile cases, the Supreme Court has forthrightly
rejected that position. In Alabama, in North Carolina, and wherever
state law has previously expressly commanded or authorized school
segregation, the Constitution does, indeed, require the mixing of races
in the schools.
When the Chief Justice came to identify just what were the continu-
ing effects of past school segregation, he mentioned only one: During
the time when segregation was commanded by law, decisions concern-
ing the location of schools and the size of schools might have influenced
8. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
9. Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (con-
curring opinion), affd sub nom. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
The Green opinion is the origin of the Court's declaration that a school board must
produce a plan that will "work now." 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis original).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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people's choices of residential location. In such an event, he noted,
the adoption today of a school assignment plan that was "racially neu-
tral" on its face would not be sufficient to counteract the effects of the
school board's past racial discrimination. 12 The Chief Justice did not
take the obvious next step, which is to recognize that the whole system
of school segregation must surely have had at least as much effect on
the racial distribution of families as did the local school board decisions
mentioned in his opinion. The Chief Justice's argument, in other
words, is more than sufficient to cover residential patterns throughout
the urban South.
It is easy to sympathize with a member of a southern school board
who might ask, in good faith, "What am I supposed to do?" No
school board, and no court, can hope to discover all the effects of Jim
Crow, let alone remedy them. Furthermore, after the state abandons
its statutory requirement of school segregation, there may be other con-
siderations, both legitimate and racially neutral, that are entitled to
some weight. The policy of the neighborhood school is one such con-
sideration. So, whatever the past history of school segregation, there
can be no absolute duty of a school board to undo each and every ef-
fect of that past history. But to say that a school board cannot be ex-
pected to do everything is not to say that it should be allowed to do
nothing. In the Charlotte and Mobile cases, the Supreme Court ex-
plored the ground between those two absolutes, and emerged with a
new desegregation standard.
In defining a school board's duty, the Court used words like "rea-
sonable," "feasible," and "workable.' 1 3  Perhaps the clearest feature
of the new standard is what it does not require; there is no constitu-
tional requirement that each school reflect the racial proportions of the
whole district. On the other hand, as I mentioned, there is a presump-
tion against the continuation of all-black or all-white schools. Beyond
that, we are left to determine the meaning of the terms "'reasonable" or
"feasible" mainly by reference to what the Court did in these two cases.
In Charlotte, the Court affirmed the district court's large-scale group-
ing of inner-city schools with outlying schools, with county-wide bus-
ing of students. And in Mobile, where the Court concluded that the
lower courts had failed to meet the standard of reasonableness, the
failure that mattered was the failure to use busing to achieve, as the
12. 402 U.S. 1, 20-21, 28.
13. Id. at 31.
Vol. 1972:383]
Washington University Open Scholarship
388 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Chief Justice put it, "the greatest possible degree of actual desegrega-
tion."' 4 The practicality of busing will vary, the Court noted, with the
time required for travel and with the ages of children. In Charlotte,
the average travel distance for elementary children to be bused was
seven miles; the maximum busing time was thirty-five minutes, one
way. The Supreme Court's approval of this order, and its insistence
on resort to busing in Mobile, demonstrate that the constitutional
standard of reasonableness, for all its flexible appearance, is not an in-
vitation to retreat from the principles of Brown v. Board of Education.
When the Court turned away from the effects of past segregation to
the present practice of segregation, it approached this second question
in a negative way, asking not whether segregation was now being main-
tained but rather whether the dual system had been abandoned. The
conclusion in each case was that the school board had not abandoned
the dual system, because it had not taken steps "to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation."
I have deliberately repeated this phrase, to emphasize that the same
considerations define both the existence of racial segregation and the
scope of the school board's duty to eliminate segregation. There is
nothing in this formula that requires an inquiry into anyone's motiva-
tions; a court is to determine whether the constitutional standard has
been met on the basis of its assessment of factors that are relatively
objective. What matters is not the school board's good faith or bad
faith, but its conduct in relation to the constitutional goal.
Although these two cases arose in the South, their reasoning is easily
transferable to the North and West. Consider the question of the con-
tinuing effects of past racial discrimination. If the decisions of a south-
ern school board concerning school location and school sizes can be
said to have contributed to racial segregation among residential areas,
then with far greater force it can be argued that official state action in
northern and western cities has produced residential segregation. Un-
til 1948, racially restrictive covenants in deeds were regularly enforced
by state courts;' 5 governmental action has often located public housing
in such a way as to intensify residential segregation;' 6 and, in a variety
14. Id. at 26.
15. The practice was held unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
16. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
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of ways, the federal government's programs of subsidy and loan guar-
antees have explicitly encouraged racial segregation in private hous-
ing.1 7  The logic of the Charlotte and Mobile decisions thus requires
northern and western school boards to take steps that are reasonably
feasible to alleviate the racial imbalance that results from past govern-
ment-sponsored residential segregation.
Once again, we may expect to hear school boards complain that they
are not responsible for residential segregation, even if other govern-
mental agencies are responsible. One answer is that the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equality is a command addressed to the
state, which cannot avoid its responsibilities by arguing that its left and
right hands are strangers. In any case, the school boards themselves
have practiced and continued to practice racial segregation. When a
school board draws and redraws its attendance zone lines, and locates
schools, and adjusts school sizes, and permits or denies student trans-
fers, it knows the impacts those decisions will have on the racial com-
position of the schools. If the school board chooses one such pattern
when it has reasonably available to it another pattern in which racial
imbalance would be less severe, then to just that degree the board has
chosen to intensify segregation. A number of federal and state courts
have recognized the reality of such choices by holding northern and
western school boards guilty of official segregation.18 Lawyers will
not be startled by the conclusion that a school board, like any other
person, is held responsible as if it intended the natural and probable
consequences of its acts.
In his opinion in the Charlotte case, the Chief Justice took some
pains to state that the Court was not making any pronouncements
about school segregation that results from causes other than explicit
state law or the deliberate action of a school board. The opinion did
not, however, mention the term "de facto segregation." That term is
misleading in its suggestion that racial segregation in our northern and
western cities has just happened, without any application of state power.
The Supreme Court has never decided a pure de facto segregation case,
and it may never again see one. At this moment the Court has before
17. See generally Hearing on De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination
Before the Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity of the United States
Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5 (1970).
18. Dimond, School Segregation in the North, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L.
REv. 1 (1972); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 5, at 216-219.
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it a case from Denver;1 9 the case is likely to be important, setting a
pattern for the North and the West in much the same way that the
Charlotte and Mobile cases have set a pattern for the South. In the
Denver case, the complaining parents did not merely allege that their
children were attending schools that were racially exclusive; they also
alleged deliberate action by the school board to maintain segregation.
Denver's experience will seem familiar to anyone who lives in a large
city in the North or the West.20 There is an area in the core city that is
largely populated by blacks and chicanos; additionally, a substantial
black population has, since 1950, moved into an area of northeast Den-
ver called Park Hill. In 1968, after years of debate, informed by study
committee after study committee, the Denver Board of Education
adopted three resolutions designed to achieve a better racial balance in
the Park Hill area by transferring students and redrawing district lines
so as to produce a proportion of about 80 percent white students and 20
percent black students in each of the schools in Park Hill. Before those
resolutions could be carried out, a school board election was held, and
two candidates were elected who had promised to rescind the Park Hill
integration resolutions. Those two votes were decisive, and in 1969 the
resolutions were rescinded. In their place, the reconstituted board
adopted a program of voluntary exchanges; if this had been Alabama
instead of Colorado, no doubt the plan would have been called a "free-
dom of choice" plan. The lawsuit against the board was filed soon
afterward. The plaintiff parents complained not only about the rescis-
sion of the Park Hill resolutions, but also of other acts of the board
which they said were designed to preserve segregation in Park Hill and
in the core city as well.
As to Park Hill, the trial judge found that the board had deliberately
maintained segregation. For example, a new school was built in 1960
in the existing black neighborhood, located to absorb children so as to
defend the existing predominantly white schools against the influx of
new black children as Park Hill changed its racial composition. When
this new school was built, there was an overcrowded white school eight
blocks away, but no children were transferred from that school to the
19. Keyes v. School Dist, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S.
1036 (1972).
20. The facts summarized here are taken from Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp.
61 (D. Colo. 1970); Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970); and the
consolidated appeal, Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
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new one. The court ordered the reinstatement of the board's 1968
Park Hill resolutions.
The trial judge reacted differently to the plaintiffs' charge that the
school board had been pursuing similar policies in the core city. Here,
he noted, the racial and ethnic composition of the area had been es-
tablished well before Brown v. Board of Education was decided in
1954. He characterized the situation as de facto segregation, and said
that the plaintiffs had not proved any improper motivation on the part
of the school board as to these core-city schools. Even so, he con-
cluded that there was a denial of equal educational opportunity to mi-
nority children who attended schools that were upwards of 70 percent
minority students. Accordingly, the judge ordered the integration of
students in fifteen of these schools with students in surrounding white-
Anglo schools; each school was to emerge from this process with an
Anglo population in excess of 50 percent.
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court as to the
Park Hill schools, but reversed as to the core-city schools. The court
of appeals did not dispute the trial judge's conclusion that racially sep-
arate education is inferior for the segregated minority students, but said
simply that the principle of the neighborhood school is racially neutral,
and that racial imbalance does not violate the fourteenth amendment
unless the imbalance has "resulted from racially motivated conduct."21
Let us suppose that the standard of the Charlotte and Mobile cases
had been applied in Denver. How would the Denver case be decided?
The answer comes easily. Consider these facts about the core-city
schools in Denver: In 1953, a new high school was opened to replace
an old one. The attendance zone boundaries were left the same even
though the new school was built half a block from one of the boundary
lines. More than half of the new school's students were minority stu-
dents; just on the other side of the boundary, half a block away, lived
white-Anglo students who attended another high school that was 98 per-
cent white-Anglo. Within three years, some black families had moved
into the white school district; the board then changed the boundary line
so that the minority school's district now included all the newly black
neighborhoods. The board said that the minority school was under-
utilized, and the white school overcrowded. It was then suggested to
the board that the way to alleviate overcrowding was to extend the
21. Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d 990, 1005 (10th Cir. 1971).
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boundary of the minority school further into the white neighborhood.
What would you guess the board did with that suggestion? You
guessed correctly.
Other examples in the record also support the conclusion that the
Denver board was aware of what its actions would mean for the racial
composition of the core-city schools. Optional transfer zones were cre-
ated, which had the effect of permitting white students to escape mi-
nority schools. At a time when a white junior high school was over
capacity, a nearby junior high, largely composed of minority students,
was under capacity; between the two schools, there was an optional
zone, and as the optional zone became increasingly a black neighbor-
hood, the board removed the optional feature and assigned all the chil-
dren to the minority school; and even after this change the white school
remained overcrowded while the minority school was still under ca-
pacity. On a standard of reasonableness, or feasibility, the Denver
board's conduct surely would fail. Still the district judge said that the
plaintiff parents had not proved any "malicious' action on the board's
part. He added this wistful comment about schools in the core city:
As to these schools, the result is about the same as it would have been
had the administration pursued discriminatory policies, since the Ne-
groes and, to an extent the Hispanos as well, always seem to end up in
isolation.22
It remains for us to ask why the two courts saw discrimination in
Park Hill and not in the core city. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact
that the minority population of the core city had lived there for a long
time, while the more recent movement of black families into Park Hill
appeared to be a case of residential mobility that deserved zealous pro-
tection against a backlash. Such protection presumably would involve
"close scrutiny" of the school board's conduct. Or, perhaps it was
merely the fact that the old school board had determined that there
was something wrong in Park Hill, the correction of which was thwart-
ed by the election of the two new members to the school board. In
either case, what determined the issue as to the core-city schools was
the conclusion by the district judge, affirmed by the court of appeals,
that the plaintiff parents could win on that issue only if they could
prove an improper racial motive on the part of the board.
There are two parts to this test. First, it is assumed that the critical
22. Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 61, 73 (D. Colo. 1970).
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question is that of the school board's good faith; secondly, the plain-
tiffs are told that they must demonstrate that the board has not acted in
good faith. The contrast to the Charlotte and Mobile cases is pro-
nounced. In those cases, the Supreme Court's test of reasonableness
focused on the effects of the school boards' actions, not on their mo-
tives. Does the Denver case mean that we have a different rule out-
side the South? The court of appeals faced that question head on, and
answered, yes. Given the neutrality of the neighborhood school prin-
ciple, the court said, "it would be incongruous to require the Denver
School Board to prove the non-existence of a secret, illicit, segregatory
intent. '2 3  The court acknowledged its own previous decision that a
neighborhood school plan in Tulsa, Oklahoma was constitutionally sus-
pect when the effect of the plan was to preserve segregation. "But,"
said the court, "that case dealt with a school system which had pre-
viously operated under a state law requiring segregation of races in
public education.12 4
This distinction, which masquerades as a rule of evidence and has
a nice surface plausibility, is nothing less than the two-constitutions
idea, packaged for sale in a new context. The idea deserves the same
treatment Justice Black gave it eight years ago. The asserted distinc-
tion rests on a factual error to the extent that it assumes that the mo-
tives of northern and western officials are significantly more benign
than those of their southern counterparts. Even more importantly,
the asserted distinction fails because it focuses on the wrong issue.
Jim Crow is a southern name, but racial segregation--even official
racial segregation-has touched every region of our country. The
leading judicial decision upholding school segregation before the Civil
War bears a name that northerners prefer not to remember, Roberts v.
City of Boston.2 5  In 1891, when the State of Georgia enacted a Jim
Crow law governing railroad cars and streetcars, a Chicago newspaper
called the law "wretched legislation," and commented, "A state cursed
with such a legislative body almost deserves commiseration. ' 26 But it
behooved citizens of Illinois not to be so patronizing. The Illinois con-
23. Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d 990, 1005 (10th Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 1006.
25. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
26. Quoted in Bacote, Negro Proscriptions, Protests and Proposed Solutions in
Georgia, 1880-1908, THE NEGRO IN THE SOUTH SINCE 1865 at 149, 153 (C. Wynes ed.
1965).
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stitution of 1848 had included a provision forbidding Negro immigra-
tion into the state; this clause was specifically approved by the voters
of Illinois by more than a two-to-one vote.2' A similar constitutional
provision was adopted in Oregon by an eight-to-one vote.2 In Cali-
fornia, the school districts of Orange County continued to segregate
Mexican-American school children until the Ninth Circuit ruled the
practice invalid in 1947.9 The ground for this decision is itself de-
pressing; the court held that the California statute did not authorize
the segregation of chicano children, since it permitted only the segrega-
tion of children who were Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian!
Even today, all our cities are affected in their racial housing patterns by
a system combining public and private power to exclude blacks from
major portions of their residential areas. Dick Gregory summed it all
up nicely when he said this to a northern audience: "Down South,
they don't care how close I get, so long as I don't get too big; up here,
you don't care how big I get, so long as I don't get too close."
When Gunnar Myrdal published his monumental study of the black
man and woman in America, his subtitle was: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy." Myrdal's study ended just as World War
nE was beginning, when the black population was concentrated in the
rural South. Even then, even before the great waves of migration that
have helped just a little to reduce northern and western self-righteous-
ness about the South, there never was a Negro problem. There was,
and there still is, a national problem, and the problem is called by a
name that is not pretty: racism. Given this nationwide heritage, the
double standard announced in the Denver case seems singularly inap-
propriate. If, in Tulsa, a school board must offer convincing justifica-
tion for maintaining segregation through the use of neighborhood
schools, there is no sound distinction based on history or on present
conditions that should turn this presumption upside down in Denver.
I am not saying that a showing of bad motive on the part of a school
board, North or South, is irrelevant. There is nothing wrong with a
rule that says the plaintiffs in a school desegregation case win if they
prove that racial imbalance is the result of the school board's improper-
27. See L. LrTWAcK, NORTH OF SLAvmY 70-71 (1961).
28. Id.
29. Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
30. G. MYRDAL, AN AmEmCAN DLEMMA (1944).
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ly motivated actions." What is wrong is the converse conclusion,
reached in the Denver case, that northern or western desegregation
plaintiffs lose if they do not prove purposeful misconduct by the board.
In many cases, of course, the same result will be reached whether or
not the courts require proof of the board's improper motive. A num-
ber of judges, both state and federal, have recently found improper
motives on the basis of proof that the effects of school board action are
to maintain racial imbalance.3 2 These courts are simply applying to a
new context the ancient learning that one of the best ways to determine
what a person intends is to look at what that person is accomplishing
by his or her conduct. Similarly, the problem of proving bad motive
can be attacked from another direction. In any constitutional case, a
court will ask: What is the state's interest in taking the action that is
challenged? If, upon examination, the asserted interest of the state is
extremely weak, then a court may conclude that there is some other
purpose for the state's conduct.33
The inquiry into motive, then, is above all an inquiry into the ex-
pected good to be accomplished by the state's action, and the harm
that is expected to result from it. The facts to be proved in such a cost-
benefit analysis are practically identical to the facts that would be
proved if the legal rule demanded an inquiry not into bad motive, but
instead into the alternative choices that are reasonably available to a
school board for avoiding excessive racial imbalance. Then why does
it make any difference whether we approach the issue of northern and
western desegregation in terms of motive or in terms of a principle of
the reasonable availability of means to reduce racial imbalance?
We have seen that the motive rule places the burden of proof on de-
segregation plaintiffs, when the burden of explanation ought to be on
31. See the persuasive argument of Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sir. Cr. REv. 95.
See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
32. See note 18 supra.
33. This is the technique used by the Supreme Court in a number of first amend-
ment cases dealing with investigations into political association. E.g., DeGregory v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). On the Shelton case, see A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANcH 51-54 (1962); H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND riE FmrST AMNqD-
ME1NT 100-03 (1965); Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven, 13 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1, 15-22 (1965).
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the school board. Under the doctrine that has come to be called "the
new equal protection," a state normally has the burden of demonstrat-
ing a "compelling state interest" to justify its imposition of disadvan-
tage on a racial minority.A3 This presumption against racial discrimi-
nation deserves to be reflected in our rules of evidence. Furthermore,
in a school desegregation case, once significant racial imbalance is
shown, and once the plaintiffs show that the board has reasonably
available to it other alternative courses of conduct that would signifi-
cantly reduce racial imbalance, it makes the best practical sense to call
upon the board to explain. its reasons for choosing to maintain the
higher degree of racial imbalance. Those reasons are surely known to
the board. And if there are no such reasons, or if the reasons are ille-
gitimate-such as opposition among whites to racial integration-then
the continuation of segregation's harms cannot be justified on any
theory.
Abandoning a motive test in favor of a test looking to the school
board's reasonably feasible alternatives thus accords with equal pro-
tection doctrine and with a commonsense approach to the articulation
of the issues. But more important than either of these considerations
is another reason why a desegregation plaintiff im Denver should not
have to prove the school board's illicit motive. Inquiring into the pu-
rity of heart of the members of the school board is a corrosive business
that can only do harm to the community. Even with the best of faith
on all sides, the painful problem of school desegregation can never be
solved once and for all in a society that is undergoing continuous
change. That means, inevitably, a continuation of communication
among a school district's various component groups-and specifically
between the school board and the minority communities, with a judge
frequently playing a useful role as broker. These discussions are dif-
ficult enough when they deal exclusively with questions of cost and
harm; their difficulty is magnified enormously when they are conduct-
ed in an atmosphere poisoned by accusations of bad faith. The prin-
cipal contribution that the courts can make to this already emotionally
charged process is to get the parties to focus on issues that can be dis-
cussed rationally.
34. For a carefully reasoned argument applying the "compelling state interest"
test to legislative classifications that produce racially discriminatory effects, see Judge
Sobeloff's separate opinion in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 588,
593 at 594-98 (4th Cir. 1971).
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Finally, a distinction which makes northern plaintiffs prove a school
board's illicit motive, but which assumes a southern board's bad faith,
deserves rejection because it mocks the ideal of a national Constitution.
It places the courts in the indefensible position of telling northern
blacks that they are entitled to a lesser degree of judicial vigilance on
behalf of their constitutional rights, and at the same time telling south-
ern whites that they have been consigned to a moral limbo reserved
for them alone. It is only rarely the case that to state a proposition is
to refute it, but this is one of those cases.
II
The problem of racial discrimination in legislative districting bears
some similarity, on the surface, to .the problem of school segregation.
In both situations, lines are drawn on maps for the purpo§e of parcel-
ing out access to government institutions. In both situations, the line-
drawing can have racially discriminatory effects. The complications
that arise in the school-segregation cases, as we have seen, are largely
logistical; the resolution of school-segregation controversies will per-
haps never be tidy, 'but the factors that should govern decision seem
now to be identified. In contrast, legislative redistricting does not in-
volve anything like the construction of new buildings, or the transpor-
tation of voters. What makes the issue of racial discrimination in leg-
islative districting a difficult issue is not a shortage of physical re-
sources, but a shortage of legal doctrine.
In 1964, when the Supreme Court gave us the principle of one per-
son, one vote,35 there were skeptics, even on the Court, who pointed
out that a carefully partisan drawing of district lines could produce a
map that would give to each district the same population, and still turn
an electoral minority into a majority of seats in the legislature.36  In
the classical form of gerrymandering, the party in control of the legis-
lature draws the lines so as to load up a few districts with overwhelm-
ing majorities for the opposition party, and spreads its own partisans in
such a way as to produce lesser, but solid majorities for its candidates.
In this manner, for example, a Republican plurality in New Jersey in
1966 was turned into a 9-6 Democratic margin in congressional seats;
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. For a thorough analysis of the problem of gerrymandering and the relevant
judicial decisions, see R. DIXON, DIEMOCRATIC REPRESuNTATION 456-99 (1968).
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and in Iowa in the same year, a Republican margin of less than 5 percent
in the vote for Congress produced a congressional delegation that was
5-2 Republican.37 All this is familiar learning. The unfairness of the
system cries out for remedy. Thus far, however, the courts have been
reluctant to try to provide that remedy, and for good reason. It is
fearfully difficult to devise judicial doctrine-standards for decision-
that will be adequate to the intricate task of defining the essentials of
effective representation. If Democrats deserve a districting scheme
that reflects their state-wide voting strength in the state legislature, then
so do prohibitionists and farmers and old-age pensioners. A general-
ized right to effective representation turns out to be more complicated
than the busing of school children.
Suppose, for example, that the New York legislature were to draw
congressional districting lines on Manhattan Island so as to load up one
district with 86 percent of voters who were black or of Puerto Rican ori-
gin. The result would be that one-and only one-of Manhattan's four
congressmen would represent a majority of voters who were black or
Puerto Rican. Perhaps you will not be astounded to know that his ex-
ample is quite real.38 A lawsuit was brought to challenge this district-
ing, on the ground that it was a racial gerrymander. How should the
case have been decided? Should the courts have ordered a redistrict-
ing, to spread Manhattan's black and Puerto Rican minority over the
four districts? To use the language of the school cases, should there
be something approximating racial balance in legislative districts? One
person who did not think so was the late Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, who intervened in this lawsuit on the side of the defendants,
to support the districting as it was. Racial balance in Manhattan
would have produced a 38 percent minority in each of the congressional
districts, and Congressman Powell rightly suspected that such a policy
might work to his disadvantage. It was, in fact, precisely racial im-
balance that assured Harlem of one representative that would be un-
mistakably its representative, The Supreme Court got off this dilem-
ma's horns by concluding that this was not a racial gerrymander at all,
saying that the plaintiffs had not proved either that the legislature was
racially motivated or (and this is truly remarkable) that the legislature
had in fact drawn the districts along racial lines.
37. Id. at 462.
38. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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In Alabama, however, a few years previously, the legislature had re-
drawn the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in such a way as to ex-
clude all but a handful of the city's black residents. In that case the
Supreme Court had held the act invalid under the fifteenth amendment
as a denial of the vote on account of race.3 9 In the Tuskegee case, the
Court had muddled its discussion of motive and effects, but the case
seems explainable only on the theory that the racially discriminatory
effect of the legislature's act demonstrates its improper motive, in the
absence of any other argued justification. How did the Supreme Court
deal with the Tuskegee case when it came to decide the case in New
York? By silence; it did not mention the case at all.
Thus was the stage awkwardly furnished when the Supreme Court
returned last year to the problem of racial gerrymandering. One case
came from Mississippi, 40 and one from Indiana.41 By now you should
know how the cases came out. These cases were complicated by an
additional factor that goes under the clumsy name of multi-member
districting. In each case, many of the state legislators were elected
to represent single-member districts of the usual type, but other legis-
lators were elected in groups from districts that were larger in popula-
tion. Thus Marion County, which includes the City of Indianapolis,
elected twenty-three state assemblymen in an election at large. The Su-
preme Court had held in the past that multi-member districts are not un-
constitutional per se, but it had also strongly implied that such a system
would be invalid if it "operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the vot-
ing strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."42
In the Mississippi and Indiana cases, the complaints were just the op-
posite of the attack that had been leveled at the congressional district-
ing of Manhattan Island. In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that
black voters were submerged in a big district dominated by whites, de-
priving them of the legislative representation they would have if single-
member districting were used.
The Mississippi case reached the Supreme Court well after the Indi-
ana case had been briefed and argued, but was decided immediately
because an election was imminent. Some redistricting was required in
this case, under the one-person-one-vote principle. Since 1964, Mis-
39. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
41. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
42. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
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sissippi had used some multi-member districts, and the lower federal
court's plan included a multi-member district in Hinds County for
both the state senate and the state house of representatives. That
court also had made a finding that there had been no racial discrimina-
tion in the case.43  On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a two-page per
curiam opinion, reversed this decision and instructed the lower court to
draw a new map with all single-member districts. All the Supreme Court
said was that as a general matter, large single-member districts were to
be preferred over multi-member districts when a federal court was
fashioning an apportionment plan. There was no mention of racial
discrimination.
Four days later, the Court handed down its decision in the Indiana
case. Here there had been an elaborate trial on the question whether
the use of a multi-member district in Marion County was unconstitu-
tional as a racial discrimination. The voters in the central-city ghetto
comprised 18 percent of the country's population, and over the past
five elections had elected from among its residents 5 percent of the
county's state senators and 6 percent of its representatives. A well-
to-do white suburban area, comprising 14 percent of the county's
population, had elected 48 percent of the state senators and 34 per-
cent of the representatives. The plaintiffs made the surprising con-
cession that this multi-member district scheme had not resulted from
any intention to disadvantage blacks, but argued that the scheme's
effects were to do just that, and therefore that the plan was unconsti-
tutional. The lower court agreed with this contention, but the Su-
preme Court reversed, by a 6-3 vote.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority, said that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that the elected legislators from Marion County
were not adequately representing the interests of the center-city ghetto.
Absent that proof, all that could be said was that the residents of the
ghetto were consistently losing at the polls, something they had in com-
mon with the minority in any election. Justice White did, however,
give the Court's blessing to a rule that would invalidate the intentional
drawing of district lines for the purpose of disadvantaging a racial
group, and he cited the Tuskegee case, along with two lower court de-
cisions from Alabama, as examples. What about the Mississippi case?
The Court simply didn't mention it.
43. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506, 520 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
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The parallel between these cases and the school cases is striking,
and the message has not been lost on the lower federal courts. One
such court, sitting in Alabama, decided just three months ago that a
multi-member district scheme was invalid, because of its effect, which
was to submerge areas with a black majority into large countywide
multi-member districts." The Indiana case was distinguishable, the
court said, because Indiana is "a State without the long history of racial
discrimination evident in Alabama."" This history, the court asserted,
made it "reasonable to conclude that multi-member districts tend to
discriminate against the black population.""'  In the South, then, a
multi-member district is suspect, and presumptively invalid, while else-
where in the country a multi-member district is presumed valid even
though it restricts the number of representatives elected by the resi-
dents of a racial ghetto. In the North and the West, such a resident
must prove either a deliberate purpose to disadvantage a racial group
or a racially discriminatory effect on something so concrete as specific
votes in the legislature.
If a ghetto resident's attack on multi-member districting depended
on carrying the impossible burden of proving such things as the precise
ways in which a state senator fails to represent a part of his or her
constituency, then the Court's decision in the Indiana case would im-
ply resignation in the North and West. But in the next case from Indi-
ana, of course, the plaintiffs will not concede the issue of racial motive,
but will argue that such a motive is demonstrated by the effects of the
districting scheme. One of the Alabama cases approvingly cited
by the Supreme Court found an improper motive on the basis of a
showing of such an effect, plus the absence of any need for the use of
multi-member districting for the purposes of equalizing district popu-
lations.47  This kind of cost-benefit analysis is closely similar to the
analysis of "reasonably feasible" alternatives in school segregation
cases.
The question naturally arises: Why did the Supreme Court insist on
a racial-motive inquiry in the Indiana case? The answer surely lies in
the majority's reluctance to plumb the mysteries inherent in defining a
right to "effective representation" in an electorate composed of interest
44. Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
45. Id. at 936.
46. Id.
47. Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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groups that are numerous, diverse and overlapping. Justice White com-
mented that the plaintiffs' theory was "not easily contained,""8 and he
is surely correct that any interest group might make an argument that
is similar to the argument pressed by the black plaintiffs in Indian-
apolis. Indeed, the logic of an interest-group theory of representation
also presses for the abandonment of even single-member districting in
favor of a system of proportional representation, with all those frag-
menting tendencies we -used to associate with politics in France. Jus-
tice White can be pardoned for turning away from such a path. Yet it
is always proper to be suspicious of an argument that begins with
words such as, "This will open the door to . . . ." If the Indiana
case seems wrongly decided-as it does to me-then we must try to
construct a container for the plaintiffs' case that will permit the Court
to avoid entering into the full-scale articulation of a judicially enforced
right to effective representation, and at the same time to reaffirm that
the fourteenth amendment means as much in Indianapolis as it does in
Hinds County, Mississippi.
In the first place, the Indiana case involved a multi-member district.
Given its winner-take-all feature, such a system of at-large elections is
peculiarly susceptible to abuse. The preference for single-member dis-
tricts, expressed by the Court in the Mississippi case, might be made in-
to a constitutional presumption in the pattern of the new equal protec-
tion, so that the state would have to justify its use of multi-member
districts, showing that they are necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.49
The other distinction between the claims of the plaintiffs in the In-
diana case and other potential claims to effective representation is the
obvious one: This was a case of racial discrimination, and both the
history of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and present-day
need justify treating racial equality as a value that deserves special pro-
tection. The majority's acceptance of the racial-motive principle shows
that this argument has not been lost on the Court. Yet the majority
might plausibly ask this question: If we are to adopt a principle of ef-
fective representation for racial minorities, what is effective representa-
48. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971).
49. The Supreme Court's willingness to treat multi-member district cases as justici-
able suggests that it recognizes the special dangers in such a system. In contrast, the
Court has tended to avoid reviewing cases involving claims of partisan gerrymandering
in single-member district situations. See Dixon, note 36 supra, at 475 ff.
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tion? In the New York case, black plaintiffs opposed a "racial bor-
ough" scheme that assured a safe congressional seat for Harlem. What
is the constitutional interest that is harmed in cases like these? Can
we consistently accept the claim of the Harlem plaintiffs and also the
claim of the Indianapolis plaintiffs?
I doubt that any black person would agonize very long over these ex-
quisitely balanced considerations. The harm, in the eyes of the victims
of racial gerrymandering, lies in the scarcity of black and brown faces
in the legislature. This harm goes far beyond any concern for the
symbolism of creating role models for the minority communities; it
goes to the heart of the legislative process. Just try telling a black wom-
an in the Indianapolis ghetto that her interest in the establishment of
a child-care center will be defended by her state senator who lives in
the white suburb. Anyone who has been in public life-or for that
matter, anyone who has even served on anything so lowly as a univer-
sity committee-knows the difference it makes to have blacks and chi-
canos present in the negotiating room. The racial balance that is
needed is not in the legislative district, but in the legislature.
The argument, then, is that the Indianapolis plaintiffs did state a
good claim for relief, since it was plain that a racial minority was sub-
merged into the multi-member district. But what of the Harlem case?
The plaintiffs' position in that case seems to me to be entirely consistent
with what I have been urging. What the Harlem plaintiffs wanted was
not just an even distribution of the minority communities across all four
congressional districts in Manhattan. Since those communities consti-
tuted 38 percent of the population, a precise statistical slice of the po-
litical pie would give them one and one-half congressmen. I am not ar-
guing that a federal judge should try to play Solomon; my point is
simply that the Harlem plaintiffs were seeking the same thing as the
Indianapolis plaintiffs: an increase in the number of legislative repre-
sentatives who clearly could be said to represent them.
I doubt that the Supreme Court will, in the near future, explicitly
embrace a constitutional right to effective representation for racial mi-
norities. But I am willing to predict that before long the Court will
reach a result that is the substantial equivalent. For the short run, I
am willing to guess that the Court will achieve that result through find-
ing racial motives largely on the basis of evidence of racially discrim-
inatory effects, just as so many northern and western judges have found
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in the school cases.50 If the Court proves me wrong-if it fails to rec-
ognize the justice of claims like those pressed in the Indiana case--then
it will be making a mistake that is truly grievous. White America
will not be taken seriously, when we urge our minority communities to
work within the existing system for peaceful change, unless such an or-
derly course is genuinely open to them. For that reason alone, the
Indianapolis decision cannot be allowed to be the end of the story.
But there is another reason, which I have taken as today's theme:
If the fourteenth amendment is interpreted to be a regionally selective
command, we shall all be the poorer. If social diversity makes a na-
tional constitution difficult, the same social diversity makes a national
constitution imperative. We have no crown to serve as a symbolic
focus for national allegiance, and today even the flag is misused for
partisan purposes by left and right alike. What we do have, in a time
when our divisions threaten to break us apart, is one preeminent symbol
of nationhood: the Constitution. If the Supreme Court nourishes the
two-constitutions idea, that unifying symbol will lose its force.
More than symbolism is at stake. Cicero saw that the idea of a
higher law implies a law that is universal. And here lies a profound
and disturbing truth for our own time. A system that provides one
law at Rome and another at Athens need not be respected as a higher
law. The more we accept the idea of two constitutions, the more we
risk having no constitution at all.
We can hope, however, that the Supreme Court will insist that the
fourteenth amendment commands a single nationwide standard of ra-
cial justice. We can hope that the Court will say-to blacks and chi-
canos in Denver and Indianapolis, no less than to whites in Mobile and
in Hinds County-what Justice Black said when he was asked to ac-
cept the two-constitutions idea: "Our Constitution was not written to
be read that way, and we will not do it."
50. Alternatively, the Court may do as some lower courts have done in political
gerrymandering cases involving single-member districts, achieving the "backdoor"
result of striking down gerrymandering in the name of refining the mathematical
equality of the districts. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail
of "One Man-One Vote," 1969 SuP. Or. Rnv. 219, 256-58.
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